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History as Ideology: Philip Hamburger's

Separationof Church and State
Kent Greenawaltt

INTRODUCTION: THREE TALES ABOUT SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE

Here are three competing stories about how the idea of separation of
church and state relates to the First Amendment clause that provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."'
A.

Separation as a Core ConstitutionalConcept

In 1802, Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Danbury Baptist Association
of "a wall of separation between Church & State." 2 This concept of
"separation," dating back to an earlier giant of religious liberty, Roger
Williams, captured the essence of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. A growing consensus in the United States embraced the
phrase's fundamental idea, and legislators dismantled all the remaining
state establishments of religion by 1833. In 1878, the Supreme Court
treated the phrase as almost "an authoritative declaration of the scope and
effect" of the First Amendment's religion clauses. 3 When the Courtrelying on the Fourteenth Amendment to make the First Amendment operate as a restriction on state power-first applied the Establishment Clause
to the states in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947, the Court adopted
the separation metaphor as its guide.4 The notion of separation of church
and state, which the Court continues to enunciate, thus stretches over more
than two centuries of American history as a core principle of American
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U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Sowing Useful Truths and Principles": The Danbury Baptists,
Thomas Jefferson, and the "Wall of Separation," 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 455, 469 (1997).

3.
4.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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political democracy for organizing relations between religion and government.
B.

Separationas a Deviationfrom Disestablishment, the Genuine
ConstitutionalNorm

At the time the Framers adopted the Bill of Rights, almost no one embraced the idea of separation of church and state and its radical disjunction
of religion and government. Religious dissenters supported the more modest concept of disestablishment-the idea that no religion should be established or supported-although defenders of establishment sometimes
accused their opponents of favoring separation. Jefferson used the "wall of
separation" metaphor, which was decidedly unfaithful to the First
Amendment, as a ploy to prevent Federalist clerics who were attacking him
from continuing their political involvement.
The concept of separation achieved prominence in the nineteenth century, in large part, because of nativist fears of immigration from Catholic
lands and the growing authority of the Roman Catholic Church. Proponents
of separation, through either ignorance or hypocrisy, claimed a historical
pedigree for separation that simply did not exist. Most of them indefensibly
envisioned separation as circumscribing Catholic power without impeding
Protestant connections between religion and government.
By the mid-twentieth century when it decided Everson, the Supreme
Court, influenced by the nativist ideas pervasive in the wider culture, accepted the Jeffersonian metaphor as its key to understanding the
Establishment Clause. Whether the Justices had been deceived or themselves sought to deceive the public about the historical soundness of the
separation approach, they constructed a foundation of sand upon which the
Court has subsequently tried to build its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. If the Court is to develop sound constitutional principles to regulate
the relation of religion and government in our liberal democratic society, it
must abandon the concept of separation of church and state.
C.

Separationas Normal EvolutionaryDevelopment

At the time of the founding, advocates of disestablishment rarely
phrased their claims in terms of a separation of church and state, although
their notions of disestablishment included significant elements of the concept of separation. During the nineteenth century, those who opposed close
connections between government and religion employed separation as their
central metaphor. The reasons why these individuals substituted separation
for disestablishment are complex, but they proposed legal restrictions that
reached beyond traditional notions of disestablishment, and they advanced
claims about appropriate behavior by individuals and religious organizations that did not directly concern proposals for legal restraint.
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Whatever their rhetoric, the vast majority of separationists never favored the complete separation of government and religion. Because they
explicitly or implicitly proposed only limited legal restraints, they could
justifiably claim that they were essentially faithful to the Founders' vision
of disestablishment. Similarly, the Supreme Court could defend its version
of separation as yielding constitutional restrictions that were fully consonant with a modern understanding of what disestablishment requires.
Consequently, were disestablishment to replace separation as the governing concept in law and political discourse today, that shift alone might
not make much difference.' The theoretical lesson that the shift in metaphor from disestablishment to separation teaches us is that large political
and legal concepts are highly flexible; their connotations and applications
change over time. Later generations may remain faithful to the ideals of
earlier ones even when dominant concepts, and the vocabulary used to express them, change.
The first story 1 have told-that separation is a core constitutional
concept-is the standard historical account or myth that Philip Hamburger
successfully demolishes in his important book Separation of Church and
State.6 The second story-that separation deviates significantly from disestablishment-sketches the main narrative of Hamburger's own account; at
the very least, it is the story that the incautious reader will take away from
the book. The third story-that separation is the product of natural evolutionary development-is quite different from the second and is also a story
we might build from the facts that Hamburger presents. But we need to do
a good bit of conceptual work to render the third story plausible. That work
is the main ambition of this essay.
The title of this Review Essay is double-edged. Philip Hamburger's
Separationof Church and State teaches us that the history of the concept of
separation of church and state is a history of ideology.' Hamburger's underlying thesis is that a robust concept of separation is historically distinct
from the more constitutionally legitimate ideal of disestablishment. The
ideology of anti-Catholicism particularly, and of anti-clericalism more
generally, has driven historical understanding of separation and has grossly
distorted historical reality. But by emphasizing certain facts, by treating the
historical record in a way that understates close connections between disestablishment and separation, and by giving separation of church and state a
solidity and decisive logic that it lacks in actuality, Hamburger's account

5.

I put the point this way because those who now advocate such a change believe the Supreme

Court has been too separationist. A successful scrapping of the "separation" metaphor in the near future
would almost certainly be a signal of important revision in what is allowed constitutionally.
6. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
7. Id.
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masks, or, at least, serves, an anti-separationist ideology about relations of
church and state.
This Review Essay is less a challenge to Hamburger's study than a
caution against its predictable uses and a plea for a richer understanding
than the book provides of how the concept of separation developed.
Separation of Church and State is a remarkable achievement. Its searching
scholarship will indelibly alter how people think about the subject of separation; the book's disturbing demonstration of the nativist influence on the
acceptance of separation must give pause to everyone who considers separation an American ideal.

I
DISESTABLISHMENT AND SEPARATION AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A.

The Trouble with Hamburger'sAnalysis

The topic of the separation of church and state is as controversial and
relevant now as it has ever been. In recent years the Supreme Court has
dismantled large chunks of Establishment Clause restrictions built up over
the past half century that were grounded on a separationist approach.'
Although I do not think Hamburger consciously wrote to achieve particular
legal and political conclusions, his book affords scholarly support for critics who contend that the separationist interpretation of the Establishment
Clause since Everson has been misconceived.9 Hamburger's narrative lends
itself to an overly simple rejection of the separationist ideal. Because this
book has the potential to influence the law's development, it is urgent that
readers understand why we should not flee from one oversimplification to
embrace another.
To evaluate Hamburger's thesis, we need to develop a sophisticated
theoretical sense of how fuzzy, general political concepts like disestablishment can develop over time, and to understand how dominant concepts
may alter without a large shift in what government practices are accepted
as legitimate. We must also discern more precisely than Hamburger the
differences between reasonable modern conceptions of disestablishment
and separation. Writing as a legal historian, Hamburger need not have
undertaken a careful conceptual analysis of disestablishment and
8.

See Zelman v. Simonns-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (approving vouchers for parochial

schools).
9.
See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Separation Anxiety, NAT'L REV., Oct. 14, 2002, at 58 (reviewing
HAMBURGER, supra note 6). 1 have heard the book cited as authority for things it does not even try to
show. In conversation, someone told me it demonstrates that the Establishment Clause was only an
allocation of power to the states, leaving nothing to be "incorporated" against the states via the

Fourteenth Amendment. Hamburger does not deny that the clause had disestablishment content for
federal government activities: his challenge to incorporation, which I discuss at the end of this Review
Essay, is to the whole idea of making provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable against the states, not
to anything unique about the Establishment Clause.
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separation, but such an analysis is a cornerstone for drawing any practical
conclusions from his study.10 My Review Essay concentrates mainly on
this issue of the paradigm shift from disestablishment to separation, saving
broader theoretical implications of the distinction for the Conclusion.
Hamburger paints separation as having vastly different implications
for the constitutional law of church and state than the much more modest
notion of disestablishment. He generates this picture by a number of discrete steps, which have a cumulative effect of leaving a substantially misleading impression. First, Hamburger does not adequately distinguish
beliefs about what legal restraints should be imposed from broader political
ideals that do not concern legal coercion. Second, he condemns as illogical
sensible distinctions between the law of church and state and broader social
relations between religion and government. Third, Hamburger attributes to
separationists certain ideals that virtually no modern believer in separation
would support. Fourth, in contrasting separation with disestablishment, he
underemphasizes the separationist elements of original disestablishment
ideas. Fifth, he disregards certain respects in which separation actually
serves to support various governmental benefits for religion. Finally, and
most importantly, in contrasting the two basic concepts of separation and
disestablishment, Hamburger neglects to consider how original ideas of
disestablishment have, or would have, developed over time. Only when we
grasp a concept of separation that is stripped of the excesses Hamburger
gives it and a conccpt of disestablishment that fairly reflects how that concept probably would have developed up to the present will we be ready to
evaluate the extent to which a shift in the prevailing metaphor from disestablishment to separation represents a real difference in legal substance.
B.

Disestablishment'sModern Scope

I need to pause for a moment to say a word about my reading of
Hamburger and my suggestion that disestablishment should be given a fair
modern scope for this analysis. Passages in Hamburger's book suggest that
our modern ideas of limits on government should be determined by the
kinds of limits envisioned by eighteenth-century advocates of religious liberty." One might take Hamburger to be proposing a kind of strict originalism, in which the practices deemed acceptable at the time of the Bill of
Rights should be accepted now. Were this Hamburger's intent, he would
(or should) object as much to a modern, expanded notion of disestablishment as to a shift in metaphor from disestablishment to separation.

10. See Marci A. Hamilton, "Separation": From Epithet to ConstitutionalNorm, 88 vA. L. REV.
1433 (2002) (book review) (cautioning that one cannot draw simple constitutional conclusions from
Hamburger's historical account).

11.

HAMBURGER,

supra note 6, at 12-13.
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I do not take Hamburger to be endorsing such a strict originalism. 2
Hamburger's book suggests that a Supreme Court that remained faithful to
a core idea of disestablishment would be acting within appropriate constraints, whereas a Court that abandoned the basic idea of disestablishment
for the distinctly different idea of separation would be exceeding its authority. For example, the Framers may have considered any preference for one
Christian group over another an unconstitutional establishment while accepting preferences for Christians over non-Christians; but a Court could
be faithful to the core of the concept of disestablishment and still adopt a
modern understanding of the concept that would forbid favoring Christians
over non-Christians. One needs no shift in metaphor to extend the protection in this way.
Hamburger is well aware that virtually all the protections in the Bill of
Rights have undergone such extensions. The modern understanding of
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the privilege against selfincrimination forbids many laws and practices the Framers would have
accepted. And, of course, the Supreme Court has read the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid certain racially discriminatory practices and to protect groups, like women, that the enacting legislators did not envision. Because Hamburger offers no complaint about such
extensions, I conclude that it is the crucial shift in metaphor from disestablishment to separation to which he objects; he thinks "separation" involves
a radical disjunction from "disestablishment," rather than the normal, appropriate development of a constitutional conception over time.
Thus, if we are to evaluate the practical significance of the shift in
metaphor to "separation," we must compare modern ideas of separation
with what we would expect to be modern ideas of "disestablishment," had
disestablishment developed free of the infection of separation, but undergone the kind of growth characteristic of ideas of free speech. It is this development I have in mind when I refer to a concept of disestablishment that.
is given its fair modern scope. I do not assume that people could agree on
the exact parameters of that scope any more than they agree on what the
Free Speech Clause should protect; but I do assume that the modern scope
would not replicate preeisely an eighteenth-century sense of what counted
as forbidden establishment.

12. 1 do not suggest that he actually rejects that view; rather, he offers a critique that does not
depend on it.
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II
DISESTABLISHMENT AND SEPARATION: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?

Never denying that disestablishment should be taken as a core
American political ideal," Hamburger develops the pervasive theme that
disestablishment was much less radical in its implications than separation
of church and state. Furthermore, Hamburger aigues, advocates of separation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries inaccurately attributed the
more radical concept of separation to the founding generation. If we accept
Hamburger's premise that separation was not the prevailing metaphor before 1800, we must develop as clear a sense as possible of how much further separation goes than disestablishment in order to assess the practical
significance of the shift in dominant concept.
In his Introduction, Hamburger sets out "contrasting implications" of
disestablishment and separation." The most obvious aspects of early undoubted establishments were an official church undergirded by laws imposing penalties and disabilities on dissenters." By the late eighteenth
century in America, few penalties remained, and critics of establishment
focused their objections instead against privileges for "established denominations-notably, salaries for the established clergy."16 Dissenters sought
"guarantees against the unequal distribution of government salaries and
other benefits on account of differences in religious beliefs. Some dissenters even demanded assurances that there would not be any civil law taking
'cognizance' of religion."" State constitutions responded to these
"anti-establishment" demands with limits on legal discrimination and on
the appropriate subject matter of civil laws. 8
Hamburger suggests that separation, in contrast to disestablishment,
implies that "legislation is suspect if it has a religious purpose or if it substantially benefits religion," particularly institutional religion; that religious
groups should not exercise full political rights; and that government and
religion should not have too much contact.' 9
Part of the difficulty in evaluating Hamburger's thesis that separation
has usurped the rightful place of disestablishment is figuring out just how
to distinguish the two concepts. Many regard them as synonymous, but
13. Someone might reject such a place for disestablishment on the basis that the First
Amendment undoubtedly permitted states to maintain established churches and that about half the
states then did have supports of religion that might be regarded as establishments. See, e.g., THOMAS J.
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 11-13, 70-72, 123-24, 136-37, 147-49, 174-76, 191, 197-98, 209-10
(1986) (cautioning that some schemes of support we would identify as establishments may not have
been so regarded by most people in the colonies and states where they existed).
14. HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 11-13.
15. Id. at 11-12.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 12-13.
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Hamburger aims to correct that misconception. As a rough approximation,
we can think of disestablishment as requiring the elimination of favoritism
toward people or groups because of their religious identity. Separation involves a disconnection between the activities of religion and government.
Of course, many laws and practices would violate both ideals. For example, federal government grants to the Southern Baptists specifically for
evangelical efforts would be a form of establishment and would fail to respect separation. On the other hand, if the government funds hospitals according to criteria that have nothing to do with religion, and some hospitals
run by religious groups happen to benefit, the funding would not seem to
establish any religion, but might be at odds with a vigorous principle of
separation. Similarly, political activities by religious associations might be
thought to connect religion and politics in an undesirable way, although
these activities do not involve an establishment of religion.
According to this dichotomy, we can quickly see that some laws and
practices the Founders might not have regarded as establishments we might
perceive differently without deviating from the basic principle of disestablishment. Most notably, many of the adopters of the Bill of Rights may
have accepted favoritism toward Christianity; we would now suppose that
preferences towards Christian groups would impermissibly establish
Christianity. Much of what follows is an attempt to discern just what laws
and practices would look more suspicious under an ideal of separation than
under a principle of disestablishment.
Over the course of his book, Hamburger mentions various aspects of
separation, as some of its proponents have understood it. In order to understand more precisely how an ideal for separation may diverge from an ideal
of disestablishment, we may place these aspects into seven broad, somewhat overlapping, categories: (A) constitutional limits on executive acts
and nonlegislative acts of the legislature, (B) separation of functions and
personnel between religious institutions and the state, (C) no laws supporting religion, (D) no legal protection of religious groups and activities, (E) no religious tests for offices or benefits and rejection of the idea
that the United States is officially a Christian nation, (F) no laws with a
religious purpose and no republican dependence on religion,
and (G) opposition to the engagement of clergy and institutional religions-especially Roman Catholicism-in political affairs.
In reviewing these categories and Hamburger's specific historical illustrations, we will consider which separationist ideas concern legal restraint and which do not, which ideas are commonly incorporated into
modern concepts of separation, and which ideas might also be required by
a modern principle of disestablishment. Concentrating on subjects of
greater difficulty and importance, we will find that for a narrow range of
important issues, the rhetoric of separation does, as Hamburger suggests,

HISTORYAS IDEOLOGY
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have a resonance different from the rhetoric of disestablishment. However,
the implications of the distinction between the two metaphors for the development of constitutional law are much less sweeping than Hamburger
supposes.
A.

ConstitutionalLimits on Executive Acts and Nonlegislative Acts of the
Legislature

Hamburger indicates that separation goes further than disestablishment, as disestablishment was understood by eighteenth-century dissenters,
because separation covers executive acts and nonlegislative acts of the legislature. 2 0 He comments that, while the First Amendment apparently places
limits only on civil legislation, by providing, "Congress shall make no
law," 2 1 courts have applied the entire First Amendment to executive actions.22 However, this application is not necessarily inconsistent with the
broad purposes of the Founders. In 1789, when the First Congress proposed the Bill of Rights, legislators may not have imagined that the federal
executive might have sufficient regulatory power to impinge on liberty of
religion or freedom of the press. Had the members of Congress considered
such a possibility, they would likely not have conferred more power on the
President to interfere with these freedoms than they granted to themselves.
More precisely, those proposing and adopting the First Amendment did not
suppose that any branch of the federal government had such power under
the original Constitution. The language "Congress shall make no law" confirmed that understanding with respect to the branch that would have been
regarded as the likely threat. With the advent of widespread regulation and
delegations by legislatures to administrators of discretionary authority, personnel in executive branches can pose a substantial threat to First
Amendment liberties. In modern times, construing the First Amendment to
apply only to statutes adopted by legislatures would be unthinkable.
The suggestion that disestablishment might preclude only official acts
that coerce ordinary citizens-a limit suggested by Hamburger's specific
illustrations of Thanksgiving proclamations and the appointment of legislative chaplains, actions then deemed acceptable-is more plausible, but it
too is untenable.23 Suppose the Rhode Island legislature appoints as its
chaplain "The Right Reverend John Smith, who represents the one and true
religion, the Roman Catholic Church," and that all invocations Smith offers are specifically Roman Catholic. Or suppose the President issues as
part of his official Thanksgiving proclamation: "All citizens should be

20.

HAMBURGER,

supra note 6, at 12.

21. U.S. CONST. amend. 1(emphasis added).
22. For example, many cases involving freedom to demonstrate are challenges to restrictions
imposed by mayors or other local executives.
23.
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 12-13.
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thankful for the Lord Jesus Christ, and anyone who has not been born again
in Christ should fervently pray for that manifestation of God's special
grace, on pain of eternal damnation." Even though neither of these official
acts would coerce ordinary citizens, they would still be unacceptable under
a modern understanding of disestablishment. Whatever may be true about
vague references that may be viewed as mild supports to religion, like
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance," a defensible notion of disestablishment would now reach noncoercive actions of executives and legislatures that formally place the government on the side of highly specific
religious understandings that do not enjoy nearly unanimous acceptance."
In our world, the fact that separation covers executive actions and nonlegislative actions of legislatures does not mark a difference from disestablishment.
This truth exemplifies the more general lesson about constitutional
interpretation I have already noted. Concepts and their applications are far
from static: they change over time as social assumptions and external conditions change.2 6 I believe such flexibility of interpretation is desirable,
even necessary, with a Constitution that is hard to amend and that has
powerful symbolic significance. 7 Whether it is wise or unwise, this
development of concepts over time is a reality that Professor Hamburger
does not challenge. Given the way all constitutional concepts develop,
Hamburger cannot fairly contrast 1789 concepts of disestablishment with
modern concepts of separation to show that the latter lack legitimacy.
Rather, we must try to imagine what a modern concept of disestablishment
would look like if it had evolved free from any corruption by modern ideas
of separation.
B.
1.

Separation of Functions and PersonnelBetween Religious
Institutions and the State

Modest and Ambitious Understandingsof Separation

The basic idea that the state and religious institutions have different
functions has been a consistent theme of all major branches of Christianity.
That state and church have different functions does not necessarily condemn participation in both by the same individuals, as when the king is
head of the church or bishops are members of the legislature. But, according to John Calvin, this distinction of function does imply that different
24.

See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).

25.

These examples do not represent a serious effort to delimit supportive, noncoercive actions

that are unacceptable from those that are acceptable. One might believe the separation metaphor tips
toward unacceptability morc than does the concept of disestablishment.
26.
See Hamilton, supra note 10 (emphasizing this evolution).
27. See Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002).
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personnel should exercise religious authority and political power.
Nonetheless, Calvin believed, the state should support religion closely, and
the church should guide and support the state.28 Calvin's model was
adopted by Puritan New England. Hamburger suggests that one "modest"
understanding of Jefferson's phrase "separation of church and state" is
simply an allusion to Calvin's differentiation of function and personnel.
Hamburger also writes that the separation may go further "to denote a freedom from laws instituting, supporting, or otherwise establishing religion."2 9 He treats this, in effect, as a second modest understanding, one also
embraced by eighteenth-century supporters of disestablishment.
Hamburger distinguishes both of these modest understandings of
separation from a more ambitious prohibition of contact between religious
and civil authorities:30 avoidance of entangling relations." Referring to this
expansive sense of separation, Hamburger remarks that "the phrase
'separation of church and state' has lent itself to a notion very different
from disestablishment." 3 2 By the end of the book's nearly five hundred
pages, an ordinary reader may not recall that Hamburger has acknowledged
two very important elements of separation embodied in the original idea of
disestablishment: distinctions of function and personnel and freedom from
laws establishing religion. Only in respect to a more ambitious notion of
separation does Hamburger claim that separation exceeds the coverage of
disestablishment.
To support his position that sharply variant understandings of the
state's relation to religion existed between the period up to the Bill of
Rights and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hamburger engages in
some contestable exercises of textual interpretation. The most important of
these is his treatment of John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration.33
Locke spoke of the church as "absolutely separate and distinct from the
commonwealth."" Given the profound influence of Locke's views about
religious freedom on many eighteenth-century colonials, this language
might seem to pose a serious problem for Hamburger, yet Hamburger
makes disturbingly short work of Locke. He comments that Locke "made
no direct objection to government support for religion."" For Hamburger,
Locke's explanation-that the church and commonwealth "are in their
original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely

28.

HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 19-24.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 3.

33.

JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Patrick Romanell ed.,

Co. 1950) (1689).
34. Id.
35.

HAMBURGER,

supra note 6, at 53.

Macmillan Publ'g
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different from each other" -helps to "reinforce[] the impression" that
Locke was merely expressing "his pervasive and hardly original argument
about the difference between religious and civil jurisdiction." 37
However, Locke's language certainly sounds stronger to modern ears
than a mere distinction of function and personnel, with religious authority
working hand in glove with political authority in a manner that Calvin or
the Puritans would approve. Moreover, although Locke does not explicitly
argue that government should refrain from supporting religion, he does
insist that churches should be regarded as voluntary societies and that civil
authority should concern itself only with civil matters. Furthermore, according to Locke's social contract theory of the origins of government, political authorities have legitimate power only over those matters for which
people require government.3 8 This formulation does not include religion.39
Locke strongly emphasizes that the purity of religion can be compromised
if the government interferes with it. In short, much in A Letter Concerning
Toleration points toward an ideal of a highly limited government involvement with religion, a far more radical abstention from contact than any
Calvin conceived. With respect to colonists persuaded by Locke, the divide
between their views of separation and the more ambitious views that subsequently developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may have
been much narrower than Hamburger suggests.4 0
When Hamburger addresses separationist positions taken in the two
centuries following the Bill of Rights, he tends to assume that they represent a highly ambitious version of separation. To illustrate, Hamburger
writes that even Presbyterians made claims to be responsible for the origins of a strong sense of separation, as if such an assertion was strikingly,
misconceived. 4" In support of his claim, Hamburger cites Rev. Thomas
LOCKE, supra note

33.
Id. at 54.
See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Prentice Hall 1952) (1690) (reflecting a position similar to that expressed in A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION, supra note 33).
39. Locke would have denied toleration for atheists and Roman Catholics: he thought those who
36.

37.
38.

did not believe in God could not be trusted to keep promises, and he worried that Catholics were loyal
to an external sovereign. Hamburger quotes Locke's general language about this in a way that suggests
that Locke was willing to limit religious toleration more than he actually was. HAMBURGER, supra note

6, at 53-54. In any event, the belief that a limited class of dangerous opinions could be suppressed does
not entail the belief that other religious views should be positively supported.

40.

However, Thomas Curry discusses a 1744 defense of religious liberty by Elisha Williams that

relies on Locke but does not doubt that government support of religion is desirable. CURRY, supra note

13, at 97-98. Also, Locke's view does part significantly with a later, more ambitious view of the gulf
between church and state on at least one important point that Hamburger emphasizes. Locke did not say
that churches should disregard political affairs altogether, and Hamburger is right that disestablishment
alone has few implications for how religious groups should conduct themselves in regard to politics.
This crucial issue, directly raised by the seventh category, is one to which I shall return. See discussion
infra Part I.G.
41.
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 345.
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Smyth, who in 1843 told alumni of the Princeton Theological Seminary
that Calvin taught "the spiritual independence of the Church, its entire
separation from civil government" and that this "grand truth" helped draw
the "lovers of freedom to Geneva" and "colonized New England, and
founded this great and growing republic." 42
A well-known cleric and scholar chosen to address the alumni of the
country's leading Presbyterian seminary, Smyth had more than passing
familiarity with Calvin's life and theology. Contrary to what Hamburger
intimates, perhaps Smyth was faithful to Calvin's theology, concentrating
on the freedom of the church from the state, not the church's lack of
influence on the state or the state's lack of support for the church. A substantial portion of Smyth's account occupies itself with minimizing
Calvin's role in the condemnation of Servetus as a heretic, but Smyth acknowledges that "Calvin thought heresies to the Church and to the State
deserved to be punished, and he gave evidence to prove that Servetus was
such an heretic."4 3 Smyth, an unequivocal partisan of Calvin, was under no
illusion that Calvin accepted an ambitious version of separation,4 and 1 do
not find any effort by him intentionally to obscure the divide between
Calvin's conception of separation and the conception that developed
through the nineteenth century.
However modest or ambitious may have been the notions of separation accepted at the founding or asserted by nineteenth-century advocates,
the relevant question today is whether our modern ideas of separation of
church and state encompass restrictions on relations of government
officials and religious personnel greater than the restrictions of mere
disestablishment.
Hamburger notes one possible implication of an ambitious separation
that clearly has no modern relevance. During the late nineteenth century,
the Central Committee for Protecting and Perpetuating the Separation of
Church and State "came close to suggesting that to remain separate from
the church, government had to refrain from acts of charity." 4 To generalize
such a limit, one might suppose that if religion and government have separate functions, government should not undertake social activities in which
religious groups traditionally, and suitably, engage. Although the degree of
tax support for private charities is controversial, no one now believes that
42.

Id. (quoting

THOMAS

SMYTH,

CHARACTER, AND PRINCIPLES OF CALVIN

CALVIN AND

His ENEMIES: A

MEMOIR OF THE LIFE,

79 (1856)). The two sentences Hamburger quotes follow

three pages of praise by Smyth for Calvin's republicanism. The "grand truths" that Smyth asserted
drew "lovers of freedom" seem mainly to refer to republicanism, not church independence of the state.
43. SMYTH, supra note 42, at 105.
44.
"Lovers of freedom," who cared about liberty of the true religion from state interference,
could well have regarded Geneva or Puritan New England as freer than the many countries in which
secular political considerations bore down heavily on the established church, including, notably,

England as well as states ruled by Roman Catholic monarchs.
45.
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 307-08.
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governments and religious groups performing parallel activities-running
adoption agencies, welfare programs, and drug rehabilitation centersitself threatens a principle of separation.4 6
2.

Nonentanglement

Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has suggested that
excessive entanglement between government and religious institutions is
unconstitutional. Would disestablishment allow for a higher degree of
entanglement than separation?
The Justices' opinions reveal three fundamentally different modes of
entanglement. The first form, the most important in the cases, is administrative entanglement: intrusion by government officials in the affairs of
religious groups, which threatens the integrity of those groups. The second
kind of entanglement is political divisiveness: fights between religious
groups over government support, which can be unhealthy for the political
process. The third kind of entanglement is the exercise of political authority by religious groups and leaders. We can examine the extent to which
each of these forms of entanglement derives distinctly from the ambitious
version of separation.
Laws that create the third form of entanglement-that is, laws that
confer on religious leaders the power to make government decisions47-are
the simplest to analyze in this respect. In the leading case, the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a law granting churches the right to veto
requests for liquor licenses within 500 feet of their premises. 48 The Court
concluded that religious bodies cannot have the final say about whether the
government grants a license. 49 For this rule, it is unlikely that separation
would have different implications than disestablishment since, even in a
regime in which religion is "merely" disestablished, religious organizations
should not exercise the power of government.50

46.

Some libertarians do believe that government should not provide social welfare benefits, and

while they may implicitly rely on private charity to replace government involvement, their arguments

do not depend on any special view about the functions of religious groups.
47.

Laws might also exclude religious leaders from exercising power permitted to ordinary

citizens. At the time of the founding, a number of states had laws excluding clergy from political office.
Because a unanimous Supreme Court held a clergy exclusion law invalid in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618 (1978), and no modern proponent of separation argues that such laws are now wise or
constitutional, we necd not pause over whether such restrictions might reasonably be seen as aspccts of

disestablishment. According to Hamburger, clergy exclusion hardly represented "a conception of
separation of church and state." HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 80. Hamburger himself thinks such laws
might have been regarded as aspects of a disestablishment that included only a modest conception of

separation.
48. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982).
49. Id.
50.

However, if one regards disestablishment as barring only preferences among religious

groups, conferring a power on all religious groups could be rcgarded as acceptable.
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Hamburger's principal thesis-that separation entails greater restrictions than does disestablishment-has more relevance for the second form
of entanglement, political divisiveness. An ideal of separation, but not disestablishment, might suggest that religious groups should not fight political
battles among themselves, for example over shares of government funds.
Disestablishment alone might seem to have little to do with how religious
groups comport themselves. But two related cautions powerfully diminish
the force of this possible difference between separation and disestablishment for modern law. The first is that one reason for disestablishment may
be to avoid just such political conflicts among religious groups. 5' The second point is that more recent Supreme Court decisions have rejected any
notion that the potential for political divisiveness, taken alone, could be the
basis to invalidate a law. 2 Thus, although according to some understandings of separation, a potential for divisiveness might be a basis for invalidation of some law, that is not the Court's approach. At most, the concern
about divisiveness is a minor background theme in the present law of the
Establishment Clause-hardly a major component that owes its status to
misguided ideas of separation.
The first form, administrative entanglement, exemplified, for instance,
by intrusive government supervision of the activities of religious schools,"
seems entirely at odds with a separation of government and religion.
However, disestablishment may apply here as well. A powerful rationale
for disestablishment is that government should not control, and indeed
should keep itself out of, the affairs of religious groups. We could easily
regard government interference that threatens the religious mission of
churches or parochial schools as threatening a principle of disestablishment. Thus, while the chain of argument against administrative entanglement is more direct and simpler from a starting point of separation than one
of disestablishment, the end result may not differ.
At this juncture, an astute reader of Hamburger's book might note that
Hamburger himself has recognized this very point in a more general way.
He writes in an early footnote, "Of course, other standards or ideals of religious liberty can also suggest the three implications [of separation] recited
here, but none has done so more consistently than the separation of church
51.

The question may be not whether such political divisiveness is harmful, but whether avoiding

it is a direct aspect of a constitutional principle (separation) or a justification for a constitutional

principle (disestablishment). Even if avoiding divisiveness figures only as a justification, it could
influence how one understands tbe principle and its applications.

52.

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997).

53.
For some years the Supreme Court wrote as if excessive entanglement was an independent
element of an Establishment Clause test of unconstitutionality, undcr which a law was invalid if it

(1) lacked a secular purpose, (2) had a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,
or (3) involved an excessive entanglement of government and religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.

602 (1971). But within the last decade entanglement has been folded back into an "effects" standard, as
one relevant element in that standard. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
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and state."54 This is fine, but if we fail to keep his own cautionary note in
mind and do not examine carefully the likely range of a modern concept of
disestablishment, we are ill positioned to evaluate Hamburger's consistent
claim that the separation metaphor has indeed made a great difference.
C.

No Laws or Executive Acts Supporting Religion

We turn now to the most important general category for Hamburger's
thesis that the metaphor of separation profoundly affects the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. We can break down the broad category of government support of religion into the following subdivisions: (1) formal recognition of religious rituals, in particular, marriage; (2) financial assistance
to religion as such; (3) financial assistance given on a basis unrelated to
religion; (4) laws and practices that benefit religion, such as prohibitions
against blasphemy and against doing business on Sunday; (5) laws and
practices that acknowledge the importance of religion, such as declarations
of Thanksgiving, the appointment of legislative chaplains, and devotional
Bible reading in public schools; and (6) classification of prisoners,
soldiers, and orphans according to religion. In most of these categories, a
modern concept of disestablishment might lead one to the same conclusions as would a concept of separation.
1.

Marriage

In inquiring whether the separation metaphor has restrictive implications that differ from those of disestablishment, we may begin with an
analysis of marriage. The state's treatment of religious marriage as having
binding civil effect is anomalous by more than one standard of judgment.
States do not give religious groups the authority to divorce couples, and in
most Western European countries, couples wishing to marry must have a
civil ceremony (church weddings do not carry civil authority). If clerics are
given the right to marry couples, church officials are making government
determinations that, in strict principle, are no different from the denial of a
liquor license. One might, of course, contrast the marriage "decision" with
the decision to deny a liquor license because the marriage decision is
straightforward and is unopposed. One might also argue that the state
sensibly gives authority to marry to the kinds of persons most couples
would choose for that purpose. But such authority for clerics could not be
justified in a world of complete separation or a world of complete disestablishment. Clerical marriage links government and religion and serves to
"establish" religious officials by giving them rights other private citizens
do not ordinarily enjoy."
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 13 n.22.
1 put aside whatever power captains of private vessels may have to perform marriages and
55.
any special rules that permit other private citizens to conduct civil marriages.
54.
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This particular comparison of separation and disestablishment highlights the danger of Hamburger's inclination to contrast disestablishment,
as understood at the founding, with separation of church and state, taken in
its most uncompromising and ambitious form. 56 Part of the flexibility of
political and overarching legal concepts is that they are accepted through
time with varying degrees of absoluteness. The crucial issue about clerical
marriage is one of degree: a moderate view of either separation or disestablishment permits our present practice; an absolutist version of either condemns it.57 At present, almost no one is an absolutist on the subject of
marriage, and clerical marriage is uncontroversial. One can imagine the
controversy over gay marriage leading to a divide between clerical marriage and civil marriage, but not because people are deeply disturbed by the
present authority of clerics.
2. FinancialAssistance to Religion as Such
A similar truth about degree concerns financial support for religion as
such. Present constitutional doctrine forbids outright government grants for
religious activities because they are religious (aside from institutional settings such as prisons and military posts), but our laws contain various tax
exemptions, deductions, and other financial benefits that go specifically to
religious groups and their leaders. Many of these, but not all, may be defended on the basis that religious groups provide social benefits and therefore fall naturally within a broader class that is not limited to such groups.
However, in Walz v. Tax Commission, the Supreme Court declined to rely
on this broader-class rationale when it sustained the longstanding property
tax exemptions for churches, instead treating these exemptions as benefiting religious bodies as such. 58 Although the financial boost an exemption
provides may far exceed that of a direct grant, the symbolism of not taking
differs from that of giving. Furthermore, tax exemptions tend to be on or
off, given or not given, rather than formulated in terms of amounts that
may vary from year to year and that could easily become the subject of
continuing political struggle. As Chief Justice Burger's opinion emphasizes, valuing church property on a periodic basis could entangle the state
officials with churches to a greater extent and more frequently than does
providing an exemption. 59

56.
See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1442-44 (arguing that Hamburger tends to depict separation
as complete separation).
57.
What would be condemned is the singling out of clerics to possess this authority. If any
private citizen, by following certain formalities, could marry couples, allowing clerics to do so would
not be a problem.

58.

397 U.S. 664, 671-74 (1970).

59.
Id. at 674. One obvious problem is that officials might value property according to their
approval or disapproval of the religious group holding it.
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Separation as a concept seems no less threatening than
disestablishment for tax exemptions and other forms of financial assistance
given explicitly for religious purposes. Full disestablishment might well
imply that religion should not be favored by the state. Hamburger mentions
that some early dissenters (who, according to him, did not accept an ambitious view of separation, but rather believed in disestablishment) argued
that legislation should "not take cognizance of religion." 60 Conferring
benefits on religious groups and clerics as such is taking cognizance of religion. Thus, for property tax exemptions, disestablishment could be even
more restrictive than separation. The exemptions carry forward a feature of
support of religious organizaearlier religious establishments 6 1-state
tions-and they might be condemned on that basis. But, because the valuation of church property could intertwine the state more with religious
bodies than a simple exemption, 62 one strand of separation theory (no
entanglement) may actually favor exemptions. For this particular form of
assistance, separation could be more permissive than disestablishment.
3.

FinancialAssistance According to Nonreligious Criteria

Government assistance rendered to groups and individuals according
to criteria other than religion provides the greatest support to Hamburger's
thesis that the separation metaphor is more restrictive than disestablishment. From a strict separationist view, the state should not aid activities
that religious groups run. But if these groups participate like other private
organizations in managing hospitals, adoption agencies, and schools, assisting them on the same terms as nonreligious organizations hardly establishes any one religion or all religions. Aid to schools involves significant
First Amendment complexities, among which are the religious character of
the vast majority of private schools, the fact that they are designed to inculcate religious ideas in addition to teaching "ordinary" educational subjects,
and the near inevitability that increased state support will increase state
regulation. But with schools, as with religious hospitals and adoption agencies, we can at least perceive that a challenge that emphasizes separation is
much simpler than one that concentrates on disestablishment. Because
neutral aid does not evidently establish any particular kind of beneficiary,
the burden of opposing "neutral" aid becomes greater if one eschews the
language of separation.

60. HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 12.
61.
However, colonies and early states without any direct financial support of rcligion did
provide tax exemptions.
62. This point does not apply to tax deductions.
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Other Laws Benefiting Religion

Let us now turn to laws that benefit religion in other ways. Prohibitions on blasphemy forbid speech that offends dominant religious beliefs.
Sunday closing laws restrict activities that compete with chureh attendance
* and, historically, have also suggested that certain activities are unsuitable
for the Christian Sabbath. The Supreme Court has held that Sunday closing
laws are constitutional only if based on the secular justification that they
offer a uniform day of rest, 63 and the modern Court would regard a blasphemy law as a violation of free speech. In this respect, then, we may say
that the separation argument has succeeded."
However, these judicial results and doctrines need not depend on
separation. A modern disestablishment argument against these laws is just
as strong. A law against blasphemy establishes the religions whose faith
may not be blasphemed. Similarly, if a state forbids Sunday work to encourage worship or to impose Christian ideas about when people should
rest, has it not established that form of Christianity against other religions
that have a different Sabbath or no "day of rest"?
5.

Practicesthat Reflect a Religious Perspective
Government practices such as devotional Bible reading, the appoint-

ment of legislative chaplains, and official days of Thanksgiving reflect a
religious perspective without involving significant coercion. Because devotional Bible reading in public schools does not necessitate any contact between government employees and institutional religion, disestablishment is
at least as powerful a basis for opposition as separation. Interestingly,
many nineteenth-century Protestants who were the strongest advocates of
separation did not think it barred Bible reading and nonsectarian Protestant
teaching in public schools. Insofar as these advocates had a coherent and
defensible position,65 it may have been that these endeavors required no
contact between the state and organized religious groups. Yet, the practice
serves to establish or support a particular religious point of view. It is a
milder version of attaching the government to a religion's creed; it tends to
make a government religion of the religious faiths that use the Bible.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's more recent decisions that Bible reading and oral prayer in public schools are unconstitutional"6 do not seem to

63. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
64.
1am avoiding judgment about whether the uniform "day of rest" rationale is a sufficient basis
for most modern Sunday closing laws.
65.
I think the position is minimally coherent (a concession Hamburger does not make) but, on
balance, indefensible. The position's minimal coherence lies in considering the main evil of
establishment as the close relations between institutional religion and political life.

66. See generally Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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depend peculiarly on the triumph of the separation metaphor rather than a
development of a modern concept of disestablishment.
The Court has not struck down declarations of Thanksgiving or the
phrase "In God We Trust" imprinted on coins, and various opinions have
assumed that these are not unconstitutional. In the 2003 term, the Court did o
consider "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance recited by children at a
public school. 67 Reviewing a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals that "under God" impermissibly supports and endorses a religious
view, a majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the atheist father's challenge on standing grounds because, as a noncustodial parent, he lacked
authority to make decisions about his daughter. The three Justices who did
reach the merits would have sustained the pledge, 68 and it seems likely they
will pick up two more votes if the same Justices address the issue a second
time. 69 Once we get over the threshold that a modern notion of disestablishment could apply to noncoercive government actions, 70 we can see that
the idea of disestablishment seems at least as promising as that of separation as a vehicle to challenge various official references to God.
The Supreme Court has actually sustained the payment of legislative
chaplains. 71 A separation argument against legislative chaplains has
considerable force because that practice involves government officers hiring and being led in prayer by a leader of organized religion. Still, one
could also fairly characterize the practice as an establishment of the chaplain's form of religion. 72 As with official references to God, the idea of disestablishment seems at least as promising a vehicle for future attack as
separation.
6.

Classifications

The appropriateness of classifying prisoners, soldiers, and orphans
according to religion depends largely on the purpose of the classification. It
makes obvious sense for a government that allows prisoners one worship
service a week to classify prisoners by their religion so they need not all

67.
68.

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor concluded that "under God" had historical and

civic significance and did not really endorse a religious view. Id. Justice Thomas thought there was an
endorsement but rejected constitutional doctrine that endorsements are necessarily unconstitutional. Id.

69.

Justice Scalia did not sit because he had criticized the court of appeals ruling. If he does

participate in a future case, he will almost certainly sustain the constitutionality of the language "under

God." Based on his votes and opinions in prior cases, I think Justice Kennedy will probably reach a
similar result.
70.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-25. It is arguable whether children are indirectly
coerced by peer pressure, even if legally free not to say the Pledge of Allegiance. See, e.g., id.

71.
72.

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Of course, the Founders did not regard this as a forbidden establishment, as the Supreme

Court emphasized in allowing it. Id. But, as I have said, we have no reason to cabin disestablishment
within the exact parameters the Framers envisioned.
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attend the same service. Orphans who are old enough to have developed an
allegiance to a particular religion should be able to continue observing their
faith. A practice of classifying religious preferences for newborns is more
debatable. Whether birth parents-both or just one-should be able to have
their children raised in an adoptive home of their religion is controversial.
But challenging such classification in terms of separation or disestablishment makes little difference, because the law that connects the state to religion also tends to impose (or establish) the parent's religion for the child.
7.

Summary

For laws that support religion but do not involve a connection of the
state with institutional religion and for laws that support religious groups,
the separation metaphor seems no more powerful a threat than a modern
concept of disestablishment. Rather, what matters is how uncompromisingly either concept is understood. Is one urging "absolute" separation 73 or
"absolute" disestablishment, or a restriction that is less absolute, perhaps
reaching only as far as most of its proponents conceive it at a particular
stage in history?
As mentioned, Hamburger notes that some dissenters at the founding
believed that laws should "not take cognizance of religion." 74 According to
Hamburger's own account, therefore, the idea of disestablishment contains
the seeds of broad challenges to any laws that favor particular religious
groups and individuals. In marking the separation metaphor as having
uniquely restrictive implications, Hamburger is on the strongest ground
with respect to laws that happen to afford support to religious bodies only
because they fall within a larger class of groups, including nonreligious
ones, that confer social benefits such as education and medical care.
Undoubtedly, this is a crucial category for modern law. 75 But we should not
mistake a sound argument about this particular form of support for a valid
generalization about the comparative restrictive force of separation and
disestablishment.
D.

No Legal Protection of Religious Groups

At certain early stages of the country's history, some who opposed
connections between church and state doubted whether secular law should

73.
To be a bit more precise, truly absolute separation is impossible. By "absolute" I mean a
separation that is as absolute as is feasible.
74.
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 12.
75.
It is also true that religious educational institutions were a source of intense controversy in
the nineteenth century, when the separation metaphor emerged as dominant. However, the
antiseparationist argument that Catholics should have support for religious schools to protect their
religious convictions and because the public schools were really Protestant differs from the claim that
all private nonprofit schools are equally deserving of support, whether religious or not.
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even protect religious groups. 76 James Madison, for example, did not believe that churches should be able to incorporate and thus hold property
beyond the lifetimes of individuals.77 These particular issues are red herrings for contentions that a modern separation approach has unacceptable
practical implications. No separationist today proposes that religious
groups be refused basic legal protections given to everyone else. Courts
may settle disputes over church property, so long as they employ standards
of interpretation that do not call for religious judgments, 7 8 and state incorporation of religious organizations is now uncontested.
We should note that the idea of separation provides a reason to allow
religious groups to engage in discrimination when other groups may not.
For example, Title VII allows religious organizations to discriminate on
religious grounds in employment, even for non-leadership positions. 79 In
this respect, an ideal of separation can bolster free exercise as a basis to
afford religious groups special, favorable treatment. Were legislators and
judges to focus only on a principle of disestablishment, they might conclude that religious groups should be treated just like other groups: any
singling out of religion for favorable treatment would "establish" religion
in relation to other human endeavors. 80 The metaphor of separation helps
sustain the notion that the government should refrain from regulating certain interactions within religious bodies that are appropriately restricted for
nonreligious bodies. 8
E. No Religious Tests or Official Christian Nation
Although many early states maintained oaths of office that effectively
excluded non-Christians or even Catholics, banning religious tests for office is now a well-settled aspect of Establishment Clause (and Free
Exercise Clause) law. 82 Given that the original federal Constitution (preBill of Rights) bars such tests for federal offices, 83 and given that any such
76.

HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 101-07.

77.

In John Noonan's account, Madison's objections to incorporation related directly to an aim to

prevent churches from amassing property. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 83-84 (1998).

78. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off? Civil Court involvement in Conflicts Over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998).
79. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987). It is generally assumed that in choosing clerics, religious groups may discriminate even on
grounds of gender or race.
80. Of course, this would be a problem only if "disestablishment" included disestablishing
religion in general as well as particular religions.
81. The concept of separation also supports the principle that civil courts should not make even
"detached" judgments about what features particular religions take as fundamental. 1 think this
circumspection promotes free exercise, although it can sometimes interfere with the ability of religious
groups to achieve their purposes. See Greenawalt, supra note 78.

82.

See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

83.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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tests tend to establish the religious views to which the officeholders must
subscribe, disestablishment justifies a bar on religious tests for office as
comfortably as does separation. The same conclusion holds if other privileges besides office are conditioned on subscribing to religious propositions.
A modern concept of disestablishment, as well as separation, also precludes official recognition that we are "a Christian nation"" beyond the
general acknowledgment that most citizens are Christians and that
Christian ideas have powerfully influenced our history and our laws. Many
members of the founding generation assumed that our country was
Christian in the stronger sense that the law should reflect and support
Christian (or Protestant) perspectives. In the nineteenth century, judges
sometimes wrote that Christian understandings guided the common law.
We can now say that these early citizens and later judges did not recognize
the full implications of disestablishment.85 For a government to become
officially Presbyterian or Episcopalian, even if Presbyterians or
Episcopalians constituted a substantial majority of its population, would
have been a forbidden establishment. Particularly in light of the wide diversity of faiths in the United States of 2005, any effort to make our nation
Christian in a similar sense would impermissibly establish Christianity.
F. No Laws with a Religious Purposeand No Republican
Dependence on Religion
My strongest misgivings about Hamburger's account are with regard
to his treatment of the influence of religion on lawmaking. Hamburger is
on solid ground in suggesting that separation has broader implications for
the subject of laws with religious purposes and for civic dependence on
religion than does disestablishment; but he fails to emphasize adequately
that here the distinction in these respects has few practical legal consequences.
Hamburger treats as a common thesis of separation the idea that laws
should not have a religious purpose,86 a thesis sometimes linked to the notion that republican government does not depend on religion.87 Whether or
not they personally accepted Christian ideas, most articulate members of
the founding generation assumed that republican government depends on a
religious citizenry. They believed that religion is the foundation of morality, and that morality is crucial for obedience to law and the exercise of
84.
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 273 (discussing Protestant clergy who did not view separation
as requiring a renunciation of Christianity on the nation).

85.

The text fails to acknowledge distinctions between federal and state authority. When states

were free to have established religions, but the federal government was not, state courts could, of

course, rely on Christian principles to develop the eommon law.
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 12-13, 304-05.
86.
87. Id. at 67-73, 294-95.
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civic virtue. 88 By contrast, some nineteenth-century advocates of separation
viewed political and religious matters as entirely distinct, thus rejecting the
common understanding that religious perspectives should pervade all areas

of life. 89
Questions about how religious understanding and practice relate to
political understanding and to the exercise of civic virtue have deep significance for the life of liberal democrats. However, proposed answers to
these questions, standing alone, have little bearing on what practices violate the Constitution. 90 The claim that laws should not have a religious purpose promises more in the way of practical implications. Although
Hamburger equivocates over whether a disjunction between religion and
politics is actually a component of a strong version of separation of church
and state, 9' he treats as illogical arguments in favor of separation that do
not endorse a disjunction of religion and politics. Thus, he treats Baptists
who favored separation but who also believed in the Social Gospel message that a religious sense of justice should guide political life, as falling
into serious tension. 92 He makes similar remarks about abolitionists and
advocates of prohibition who simultaneously favored church-state separation but asserted underlying religious grounds for their causes. 93 Having
long believed in a substantial legal separation of church and state, while
strongly resisting the exclusion of all religious judgments from political
life, 94 I was disquieted by Hamburger's suggestion that embracing both
positions involves a kind of incoherence.
To unpack the issue about religious purposes for laws, we need to
consider what might count as a religious purpose. As a rough categorization, we may distinguish (1) laws that are aimed specifically at promoting
particular religious groups or religious views (for example, the Sunday
closing laws, if they are adopted to promote Sunday religion); (2) laws
that enforce a religious morality (for example, laws against homosexual
relations based on the view that the Bible considers such relations sinful); (3) laws that reflect a religious view about entities we should value
(for example, laws protecting animals because they are God's creatures);

88. Id. at 66.
89. Id. at 151-55, 253-59, 274.
90.
Even if religion is a necessary underpinning of republican government, or if religious notions
should ideally influence political judgments, it still does not follow that governments must have contact
with religion or support religion. Perhaps religion supports civic virtue and influences political
decisions best if it is unsupported by government action.
91.
Compare HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 155 (describing the disjunction of religion and
politics as a related thesis), with id. at 379 (implying that the disjunction is one aspect of separation).
Id. at 378-80.
92.
93. Id. at 243-46, 265-67.
See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT
(1988) (asserting that a complete
disjunction of religion and politics does not follow from separation).
94.

GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
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and (4) laws that reflect a religious sense of justice about how secular
benefits should be distributed (for example, laws that aid people in need
based on a biblical understanding of society's obligations to the poor).
We have already examined the first category-laws that support religion in some form. My own view about laws in the second category, those
that enforce a purely religious morality, is that they unacceptably impose
religion on others. 95 On the other hand, laws in the third and fourth categories-laws adopted because people rely on religious bases to assign entities
a value or to determine what justice requires in the allocation of secular
benefits-do not impose religion in the same way. 96 Scholars with widely
variant positions agree at least that this subject is complex. But we should
certainly not assume that every reliance on religious convictions to formulate political conclusions is necessarily at odds with a defensible ideal of
separation of church and state. 97
Another crucial point concerns any principle that laws should not have
a religious purpose. Such a principle can directly guide legislators and citizens not to vote for or advocate proposed laws they conceive as serving
such purposes, and the principle may help citizens evaluate their representatives. But what the principle signifies for laws that are adopted, at least in
part, to serve (improper) religious purposes is less evident. Is their status as
laws undermined? Outside the realm of laws that promote religious groups
and religious views, we will, in this diverse society, virtually never have
laws adopted exclusively to serve religious purposes. Religious purposes
will always mix inextricably with secular ones. Consider, for example, the
following plausible secular justification for welfare that might mix with a
religiously based concern: "We should support the poor because they are
equal citizens and because a culture of poverty is bad for the economy and
breeds crime." Given the typical mixture of religious and secular rationales
and the opacity of the deep underlying judgments that lead people to form
opinions about welfare, a principle that laws should not serve religious
purposes is rarely, if ever, a helpful constitutional guide for courts if it goes
beyond a ban on the promotion of religious groups and ideas. 98 Thus, the
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For example, Thurgood Marshall, one of the strongest separationists among recent Supreme

Court Justices, never disparaged clergy involvement in the civil rights movement (in which he was
directly engaged for most of his legal career) or arguments for civil rights grounded in religious
notions.

98. Even in this limited domain, the "no religious purpose" principle does not help very much.
One can identify a law as promoting a religious point of view without worrying too much about why
legislators adopted it, and when the Supreme Court has struck down laws because they were adopted

for religious purposes, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (law requiring teaching of
creationism if evolution taught), it could have relied on the laws' effects.
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more expansive versions of the separationist idea that laws should not have
religious purposes relate more to contested ideals of political behavior than
to practical constitutional law, and they have had little influence on the
Supreme Court.99
G. Opposition to the Engagement of Clergy and InstitutionalReligionsEspeciallyRoman Catholicism-inPoliticalAffairs
Hamburger suggests that Jefferson's original use of the metaphor of
separation was designed to quell the vicious attacks on him by federalist
clerics.' 00 Hamburger is right that an ideal of separation lends itself more
directly to criticism of religious participation in politics than does the concept of disestablishment, which has little bearing on whether religious
leaders should circumscribe their political efforts. But any appraisal of the
political activities of religious leaders has slight relevance to constitutional
law. Certainly the Establishment Clause itself, focused as it is on what the
government can and cannot do, does not address the rights of clergy to
preach about politics or political candidates. And, for the reasons we explored in connection with laws based on religious purposes, holding laws
or elections invalid because organized religious groups take stands on issues or candidates would be impractical. One might fantasize about a separation argument that would underpin a law making it a crime for clergy to
preach politics, but Congress would never adopt such a law. And such a
law would, in any event, clearly violate basic modern conceptions of free
speech and free exercise.
According to Hamburger, in the nineteenth century, separation was
significantly linked to anti-Catholic sentiment. Hamburger's selection of
sources, however, does not allow us to discern the main basis of this sentiment or just how dominant it was.1 0' Although Protestant individualism
was strongly at odds with the Episcopal authority of the Catholic Church in
their competing conceptions of religious community, separation of church
and state alone has nothing to say about how a religious group understands
its community and chooses to govern itself. Those who believed that
church officials unduly influenced Catholic voters in their political
decisions could see this as violating a healthy separation of church and
99.
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 111-17. However, it has been suggested that laws prohibiting
homosexual behavior are invalid because they were adopted to enforce a religious morality. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. But cf LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 247 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that
Jefferson expressed himself in the letter to the Danbury Baptists "with deliberation and precision").
101. At least three forces were at work to create this sentiment: outright prejudice against
Catholic immigrants; the residue of an older conception in England and the colonies that the Catholic
Church was the anti-Christ; and the general movement toward liberal individualism, which produced
antagonism to the Catholic Church because popes in various encyclicals strongly resisted that
movement. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, JONATHAN EDWARDS: A LIFE, 311-16 (2003); NOONAN, supra
note 77, at 26-28.
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state. 102 But, barring radical proposals to control internal church organization or to disqualify Catholics from voting (which would violate the religious clauses), this aspect of separation concerns social ideals, not legal
restraint and constitutional law. 103 Certainly, today, no separationist proposes special legal restrictions on the Catholic Church or Catholic voters.
Thus, even if it is true that some ambitious version of separation may, in
contrast to disestablishment, have negative implications for particular political activities of strongly hierarchical churches and of religious leaders
more generally, these are not matters of legal consequence.

III
NATIvISM'S INFLUENCE ON INCORPORATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Professor Hamburger's discussion of the incorporation of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment is a
sideshow to his central message that ideologues managed to substitute
separation for disestablishment; but, of course, if incorporation itself is
fundamentally misconceived, courts are wrongly imposing federal constitutional restraints on states and localities around the country. Because of that
practical implication, a brief response to his discussion is needed.
Hamburger describes the controversies swirling around the proposed
Blaine Amendment to the federal constitution, 1 a late nineteenth-century
proposal that would have forbidden public fmancial backing of religious
institutions. The wide support that this amendment drew signaled the
strength of anti-Catholic sentiment. It also suggested, Hamburger believes,
that at that time virtually no one assumed that the Establishment Clause
applied to the states.
Hamburger's main challenge to incorporation, however, is not with
respect to the Establishment Clause in particular, but to the whole concept
of incorporation, which he suggests was largely driven by nativist sentiment. 10 5 Why the Supreme Court has decided to incorporate almost all of
the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment is a vast topic beyond the scope of this Review Essay, but Hamburger's treatment of the
issue raises some substantial questions.
In contrast to various other scholars, Hamburger does not contend that
the Establishment Clause is peculiarly unsuited for incorporation either
102. People responded similarly to statements in 2004 by a small minority of Catholic bishops that
Catholics should not vote for a Presidential candidate who supports a permissive law of abortion. David
D. Kirkpatrick & Laurie Goodstein, Group of Bishops Using Influence to Oppose Kerry, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2004, at Al.
103.
However, someone might have relied on the anti-democratic character of the Roman Catholic
Church as one reason not to provide it with support that would otherwise be available.
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supra note 6, at 321-28.
Id. at 434-35, 447-48.
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because the original clause permitted states to have established religions or
because establishments do not violate individual rights. Nor does
Hamburger argue that the near success of the Blaine Amendment itself
showed that people regarded the Establishment Clause as distinctively inapt for application against the states. The only reason that we had a near
amendment about religion rather than free speech or the privilege against
self-incrimination was because many more citizens were concerned about
support to religion, especially religious schools, than about interferences
with speech or techniques of criminal investigation.
Hamburger assumes the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not mean to incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights and that people of
that time and in the decades thereafter did not believe the amendment had
this effect. 0 6 He does not try to add to the literature on that controversial
topic. And he does not address the highly plausible argument that, regardless of original intent, a country that has become increasingly close-knit
economically and culturally should have the same basic standards apply to
individual liberties against the national and regional governments and that
the obvious place from which to draw such standards is the Bill of Rights.
Instead, Hamburger suggests that a nativist sentiment permeating
American culture was a major impetus toward incorporation.1 07
Hamburger's assertion seems to me both inadequately supported and
unpersuasive. I shall mention here only my major doubts.
First, one must distinguish nativism from an ethos of individualism,
although distaste for Roman Catholic authority connected the two sentiments. Liberal individualism was a powerful political ideology in the nineteenth century in the United States and in much of Europe. The Supreme.
Court's first decision applying a provision of the Bill of Rights-the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment-to the states1 08 is explicable in terms of economic laissez-faire, not in terms of nativism. Similarly,
when the Free Speech clause was first employed against the states, it was
mainly to protect political subversives or activists on the left-hardly the
darlings of nativists.109 The first free exercise decision protected a
Jehovah's Witness-again not a nativist favorite." 0 Incorporation of the
Establishment Clause, which in its separationist version Hamburger ties
most closely to nativism, came much later in the day, indeed half a century
after the Just Compensation Clause constrained the states. All in all,
Hamburger provides us little basis to conclude that nativism, as distinct
from a more generalized individualism, was a major force in the march
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107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.

at 436-39.
at 434-35.
Chicago, Burlingame and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
See, e.g., Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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toward incorporation. If individualism and an emphasis on rights played
the dominant part, we should decline to see nativism as soiling the grounds
of incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
CONCLUSION

Philip Hamburger has suggested a fascinating history of how
"separation of Church and State" supplanted disestablishment as the dominant metaphor for church-state relations and the application of the
Establishment Clause. However, his claim that this substitution has radically affected the course of constitutional law is more complicated than he
acknowledges. Hamburger tends to compare a historically grounded notion
of what disestablishment entailed with the most expansive versions of
separation. A fairer comparison would be between what we might expect
from contrasting an evolving notion of disestablishment with a reasonable
modern version of separation.
This Review Essay has attempted just such a comparison and suggests
that many legal consequences arising from separation are equally supportable from the standpoint of disestablishment. Many ways in which
Hamburger's notion of separation seems genuinely to depart from disestablishment either have little, if anything, to do with constitutional law, or are
founded on a version of separation that would not be defended by modern
separationists. Indeed, there are few practical legal issues in which separation supports a different conclusion than "mere" disestablishment. Aid to
religious institutions, such as parochial schools, given on a neutral basis,
represents the most important of these situations. Contesting this type of
aid with a separation metaphor is simpler than arguing from a disestablishment perspective. But one cannot generalize from this example to conclude that Establishment Clause law as a whole has been much affectedHamburger might say infected-by the substitution of separation for dises-

tablishment.
We also need to recognize three broad theoretical points that
Hamburger largely neglects. First, all political and legal ideas shift over
time, both in how people understand the ideas and in what they regard as
their proper applications. These shifts are caused in part by a fluid social
reality against which the ideas are applied and by changing values that may
be concealed by continuity in verbal formulations.
Second, all political and legal concepts overlap with other political
and legal concepts. Dominant concepts may shift, but newly emerged
dominant concepts usually connect significantly to their predecessors, and
many of their applications may be similar. To take just one salient example, the right of a woman to choose an abortion may be phrased as a right
to control one's own body, a right of privacy, or a right to autonomy. These
ideas carry somewhat different connotations, but people who use them may
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not be far apart in their values."' The fact that the term "separation of
church and state" largely replaced "disestablishment" does not itself indicate a radical change in perspective, especially since the original idea of
disestablishment in this country contained substantial components of separation.
Finally, related to the significance of these shifts in dominant concepts
is the reality that at any stage of history, people advance versions of ideals
that are more or less uncompromising, depending on the other values these
people hold. At the founding, most fervent proponents of equality did not
believe in social equality for women or slaves, but that does not mean they
did not believe in equality at all. Many ideals are compromised because of
limited vision or as a concession to what can be achieved at the time. But
ideals that are constrained rather than absolute may instead be based on
coherent justifications. Hamburger too quickly concludes that any separationists who fall short of the strongest versions of separation are trapped in
incoherence. 1 have objected in this Review Essay to his apparent assumption that strong legal separation of church and state implies an absolute
disjunction of religion and politics. In this respect, 1 believe that the people
he challenges for not seeing that politics should be free of religion had
available a justification that was not only coherent but persuasive.
Hamburger also explores the failure of many separationist Protestants
to realize that their position should have led them to object to all the manifestations of Protestantism in public schools. Here Hamburger is right that
a persuasive theory cannot on the one hand attack involvement between
Roman Catholicism and the state and, on the other, approve public instantiations of Protestantism. But perhaps serious people free of prejudice
might have conceived that the main dangers of establishment concerned the
relations between government and institutional religion, not the state purveying religious principles in public schools. Although 1 do not accept that
view, I wish Hamburger had tried harder to understand whether people
who held this view had any rationale beyond mere prejudice and willful
blindness.
In summary, Hamburger oversimplifies the relation between the logic
of separation and disestablishment, and his mode of historical analysis
glosses over subtleties in the way political and legal concepts develop. It
also glosses over the reality that two people who hold competing understandings of broad ideals they share may be able to offer coherent, reasonable defenses of their own particular positions. So it has been with people
who have embraced the ideals of disestablishment and its offspring, separation.

i11. Seeing abortion as an aspect of equality rights involves a more distinctive departure from
"privacy" or "autonomy."

